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Towards Efficient Hazard Identification in the Concept Phase
of Driverless Vehicle Development*
Robert Graubohm1, Torben Stolte1, Gerrit Bagschik2, and Markus Maurer1
Abstract— The complex functional structure of driverless
vehicles induces a multitude of potential malfunctions. Es-
tablished approaches for a systematic hazard identification
generate individual potentially hazardous scenarios for each
identified malfunction. This leads to inefficiencies in a purely
expert-based hazard analysis process, as each of the many
scenarios has to be examined individually. In this contribution,
we propose an adaptation of the strategy for hazard identifi-
cation for the development of automated vehicles. Instead of
focusing on malfunctions, we base our process on deviations
from desired vehicle behavior in selected operational scenarios
analyzed in the concept phase. By evaluating externally ob-
servable deviations from a desired behavior, we encapsulate
individual malfunctions and reduce the amount of generated
potentially hazardous scenarios. After introducing our hazard
identification strategy, we illustrate its application on one of the
operational scenarios used in the research project UNICARagil.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conducting a hazard analysis poses a major challenge
within the development of safety-critical automated driving
functions. The identification of unacceptable risks due to haz-
ards is essential for a safety concept development. In order
to identify hazards, malfunctioning behaviors of the vehicle
under design are considered in context of its operational
scenarios. To describe resulting scenarios where the vehicle
poses hazards to health and life of humans, we propose the
use of the term hazardous scenario [1].
Instructions for the systematic identification of hazardous
scenarios can be found in the functional safety standard
ISO 26262 [2, Part 3, 6.4.2]. The application of these in-
structions in the development of driverless vehicles, however,
remains an open problem. In contrast to conventional vehicle
electronics, the system boundaries and operational context of
driverless vehicles for public roads result in a vast amount
of possible operational scenarios and potential malfunctions.
Bagschik et al. [3] demonstrate this problem: closely follow-
ing the instructions of ISO 26262, they generate more than
21,000 potentially hazardous scenarios for a limited use case
of driverless operation.
Finding hazardous scenarios and their functional causes
already in early design stages is necessary to iteratively de-
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velop safety mechanisms and to define appropriate functional
system boundaries from the beginning. Additionally, with
regard to SAE level 3+ vehicles [4], safety aspects to be
analyzed exceed the functional safety perspective [5], [6].
Therefore, an approach to systematic hazard identification
for driverless vehicles has to enable hazard analyses in early
design stages and from multiple safety perspectives.
Prior to the hazard identification, the safety life cycle of
ISO 26262 requires to specify the functionalities, boundaries,
operational conditions, etc. of the system under development
in an item definition. In order to include safety of the
intended functionality (SOTIF) [7] and behavioral safety [8]
considerations, we develop safety concepts on a vehicle level
in the concept phase. Consequently, when generating the item
definition, multiple systems and mechatronic components of
a vehicle are combined within one item. On the one hand, the
macroscopic description of vehicle functionalities supports
the definition of hazards on the vehicle level, as required by
ISO 26262. On the other hand, many functions bringing forth
multiple possible malfunctions have to be analyzed in a sin-
gle hazard identification process. Evidently, the combination
of all potential malfunctions with all operational scenarios is
not feasible for complex automated driving systems.
Currently, we are in the process of developing a safety
concept for driverless vehicles in inner city traffic as one
of the goals in the research project UNICARagil, which
is further introduced in Section IV. In order to account
for safety aspects beyond functional safety and to enable
a hazard analysis and risk assessment in the large opera-
tional design domain, we adapted the conventional hazard
identification strategy and discuss our alterations in this
contribution. First, the hazard identification in related work is
discussed in the following section. Subsequently, Section III
introduces our proposed adaptation of the identification of
potential malfunctioning behaviors. To illustrate the manage-
able amount of generated potentially hazardous scenarios,
Section IV presents an application of our approach in the
research project UNICARagil. Lastly, Section V gives a
comparison of the proposed strategy for hazard identification
with other published processes.
II. PUBLISHED HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
STRATEGIES
A. Hazard Identification Instructions of ISO 26262
Within the development process of ISO 26262, the iden-
tification of hazardous scenarios caused by malfunctioning
behavior of the item is part of the hazard analysis and
risk assessment task. The situation analysis performed for
hazard identification shall combine operational situations,
operating modes, and an item’s malfunctioning behavior [2,
Part 3, 6.4.2.1]. Operational situations represent intended use
and foreseeable misuse of the system under development
within its operational design domain. Menzel et al. [9]
propose the use of the term operational scenario instead of
operational situation in context of the definition by Ulbrich
et al. [10], which has been picked up by the ISO/PAS 21448
(SOTIF) standard [7].
ISO 26262 demands a systematical determination of haz-
ards based on possible malfunctioning behaviors of an item,
which is described as the loss of one or several functions.
The standard suggests the use of failure mode and effects
analysis (FMEA) approaches and a hazard and operability
study (HAZOP) to support the investigation. The effects
of the malfunctioning behavior of an item are analyzed
subsequently to identify hazards. In order to allow a risk
classification by evaluation of potential consequences of each
hazard, ISO 26262 requires hazards to be defined at the
vehicle level. A distinct feature of the hazard identification is
the presumption of correct functionality of every other suffi-
ciently independent system when identifying hazards caused
by malfunctioning behavior of the item [2, Part 3, 6.4.2.3].
The hazard identification strategy within the development
process of ISO 26262 is widely adopted by concepts and
case studies described in related work (cf. Section II-B).
However, Van Eikema Hommes [11] points out an overall
lack of specific guidelines in ISO 26262 on how to conduct
hazard identification as a structured process.
B. Related Work
Bagschik et al. [3] describe the process of systematic
identification of hazardous scenarios on a vehicle level in
the context of the development of an unmanned protective
vehicle for hard shoulder roadworks. Their work includes a
discussion on the scientific and normative background of the
term hazard in the context of automated driving. Due to the
limited applicability of traditional hazard analysis techniques
in the concept phase of development, they utilize skill graphs
presented by Reschka et al. [12] as a functional model
of the system to identify potential system malfunctions. In
context of the same project, Stolte et al. [1] present the
process and results of an expert-based hazard analysis and
risk assessment for the vehicle guidance system.
Based on research by Bu¨ker et al. [13], the research project
PEGASUS uses a keyword-based strategy to identify haz-
ards [14]. To find hazardous scenarios, they analyze incorrect
vehicle behavior due to component failure in the context
of operational scenarios. Subsequently, uncovered potential
hazards are an input for the identification of automation risks
of the introduction of a highly automated driving function
into public traffic.
Valdez Banda et al. [15] apply a systematic hazard analysis
for early design stages to autonomous vessel concepts for
urban transport. They identify 15 hazards that can lead
to accidents by analyzing system states and operational
conditions. The definition of ten potential accidents is based
on statistical data and experts’ judgement. In a subsequent
process step, Valdez Banda et al. detail their hazard descrip-
tions by incorporating causal factors, potential severity, and
types of consequences.
Aceituna [16] performs a hazard assessment for an au-
tonomous vehicle in an urban environment. He uses domain
models to narrow the hazard space analyzed in an expert-
based hazard identification. Aceituna details possible causes
and safety measures for 19 hazards in the interaction of an
autonomous vehicle with its environment.
The following publications (i.e. [17]–[20]) discuss the
identification of hazards as part of a safety concept develop-
ment, but do not indicate a systematic process to find relevant
malfunctioning behaviors. For example, Alexander et al. [17]
introduce a hazard identification based on an energy trace
and barrier analysis as well as checklists as a first step of
safety requirement analysis for an unmanned aerial vehicle.
Scho¨nemann et al. [18] discuss the process and results of
a systematic hazard analysis and risk assessment process
for an automated valet parking system. They propose to
perform the hazard identification in each individual scenario
based on potential malfunctions of the system. To address
multiple safety aspects and analyze potential accidents, Lurie
and Miller [19] propose a Markov process that describes
transitions between driving situations and hazards. Based on
Kurd et al. [21], Dreany and Roncace [20] identify hazards,
causal factors, and generic mishap by iteratively assessing the
application and functional structure of an unmanned surface
vehicle.
Other publications discuss the hazard identification pro-
cess in the context of the development of vehicle subsystems
in conventional vehicles. For example, Beckers et al. [22]
apply a model-based hazard analysis method to an elec-
tronic steering column lock. They use guidewords to identify
potential failures based on the specified functions of the
item, and subsequently identify hazards by analyzing the
effect of malfunctions observed at the vehicle level in a
set of scenarios. Similarly, Becker et al. [23] combine mal-
functioning behaviors of an electric power steering system
with operational scenarios to determine hazards. Sexton et
al. [24] perform a systematic identification of hazards for
a shift-by-wire system. Moreover, an experimental study of
two methods for hazard identification in the early phases of
development of an electronic steering column lock system
has been performed by To¨rner et al. [25]. They find the
induction of generic failure modes on a system level to
be more efficient than the application of generic low-level
hazards to components.
Altogether, most published approaches for a systematic
hazard identification are limited to functional safety. In
contrast, safety analyses beyond functional safety consid-
erations require a wider perspective towards sources of
potential malfunctioning behavior. ISO/PAS 21448 [7], for
example, specifically addresses hazards due to performance
limitations and foreseeable misuse. Both types of hazards
remain unidentified when strictly and solely performing haz-
ard identification for functional safety. The SOTIF standard,
however, adopts the overall hazard identification strategy
of ISO 26262 by analyzing unintended behavior caused by
triggering events within specific scenarios [7, Clause 6.2].
The hazard identification performed in related work is
widely based on combining operational scenarios with all
identified potential system failures. Here, the presumably
high number of possible malfunctions of driverless vehicles
results in an amount of potentially hazardous scenarios that
can likely hinder an efficient expert-based hazard analysis.
In contrast, a manageable amount of generated potentially
hazardous scenarios is required for the integration of a sys-
tematic identification approach in the safety analysis process
of the concept phase. The adaptation of the identification
strategy of potential malfunctioning behaviors proposed in
the following section aims to address this problem.
III. PROPOSED HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURE
The implementation of a hazard identification process
strongly relies on the definition of possible malfunctioning
behaviors before putting the vehicle behavior in context
of operational scenarios. The strategies for hazard identi-
fication described in Section II-A infer potential malfunc-
tioning behaviors from potential system failures. A major
weakness of combining a large set of potential behaviors
with operational scenarios is the inefficiency of a manual
evaluation of the multitude of potentially hazardous scenarios
generated. Bagschik et al. [3] found for their use case that
several individual scenarios have been created that lead to
the same hazards and receive the same risk classification.
A main reason for the generation of redundant scenarios
is the fact that multiple potential malfunctions lead to the
same externally observable malfunctioning behavior of an
automated vehicle.
In order to avoid generating redundant scenarios in the
context of complex automated driving systems, we propose
to adapt the process of identifying the potential malfunc-
tioning behaviors. Since hazards are defined on a vehicle
level, the degrees of freedom of the ego-vehicle within
operational scenarios are limited to the externally observ-
able vehicle motion. Additionally, every operating scenario
includes the description of a desired externally observable
behavior, which does not lead to any hazards. Applying this,
the proposed hazard identification approach infers malfunc-
tioning behaviors from potential deviations from the desired
vehicle behavior. Thus, the systematic generation of poten-
tially hazardous scenarios is not affected by equivalently
effective malfunctions of the system.
The potential decrease in size of the dataset of scenarios to
be subsequently assessed can be expressed in mathematical
terms: Let M be a set of all malfunctioning behaviors due
to individual malfunctions and let S be a set of distinct
scenes in operational scenarios, the set of systematically
created potentially hazardous scenarios PM has the size of
the Cartesian product |M × S| = |PM |. With regard to the
identification of concrete hazards f : PM → H Bagschik et
al. [3] found that |PM |  |H|.
The set of deviations from the desired externally observ-
able vehicle behavior D corresponds with the injection of
malfunctioning behavior due to malfunctions g : M → D.
For complex automated driving systems |M | > |D| was
observed, with g(M) ⊆ D, as some specific deviation might
not be caused by an individual malfunction. However, the
analysis of the full set of potential deviations is still beneficial
in the context of behavioral safety. Applying potential devia-
tions, the set of systematically created potentially hazardous
scenarios results from a Cartesian product of scenes and
deviations |PD| = |D × S|. For SAE level 3+ vehicles, we
find that |PM | > |PD|, while f(PM ) ⊆ f(PD).
The presence of equivalently effective malfunctions can
be illustrated using the scenario depicted in Fig. 1. The
automated ego-vehicle is following its lane with oncoming
traffic in the opposite lane. In order to perform a compre-
hensive safety conceptualization, the item definition includes
all components of the driving functionality (cf. [26] for a
detailed discussion of item boundaries for a vehicle guidance
system). Within the specified operational scenario, both ve-
hicles follow their own lane without interference. A distinct
deviation from the desired behavior of the ego-vehicle is
improper and undesired yawing resulting in an entry into
the opposite lane. Recognizably, lane departure results in a
hazardous scenario comprising the potential hazard of a crash
with the oncoming vehicle.
Ego
desired
deviating
Fig. 1. Operational scenario of oncoming traffic on a two-lane road
By identifying the malfunctioning behaviors of the vehicle
based on potential deviations from the specified desired
behavior in a scenario, undesired and improper yawing is
one potential deviation, independent of specific functional-
ities. Thus, a systematic combination of distinct externally
observable malfunctioning behaviors with the scenario of
Fig. 1 generates the hazardous scenario of lane departure
and collision with oncoming traffic only once.
In contrast, when combining potential malfunctions with
operational scenarios, the results can contain one specific
external behavior, such as the improper and undesired yaw-
ing, multiple times. In the example presented, the list of po-
tential system malfunctions generating the same potentially
hazardous scenario of improper yawing during lane following
contains, among others:
• Inaccurate lane detection
• Inaccurate map-relative localization
• Erroneous target pose or trajectory planning
• Erroneous trajectory tracking
• Inaccurate ego-motion estimation
• Erroneous acceleration or brake signals at any wheel
• Erroneous steering signals
• Erroneous steering, brake, or drive actuation
• Defects of wheel or actuation systems
To avoid inefficiencies, strategies can be developed to
identify redundant hazards before performing an expert-
based risk assessment. However, there are limitations for
automatic filtering. For example, not every potential collision
with a specific traffic participant or object is part of the
same hazardous scenario and, thus, can be handled as an
equivalent hazard. The externally observable behaviors of
the vehicle might differ in specific hazardous scenarios (e.g.,
collision with an obstacle due to insufficient braking versus
no braking).
Our proposed strategy for hazard identification is based
on operational scenarios, as defined in the ISO 26262 de-
velopment process. In the scenario definition, we include
a concrete description of the desired externally observable
behavior for the vehicle under development. Subsequently,
we introduce deviating vehicle behaviors in the selected
scenarios and analyze the potential consequences. We do not
integrate individual potential malfunctions when generating
potentially hazardous scenarios, but use the functional range
described in the item definition to analyze the potential
externally observable behaviors of the vehicle deviating
from its desired functionality. In principle, deviating vehicle
behaviors in a scenario can be any physically possible vehicle
motion, considering the intended functional range. In the
context of automated vehicles the major longitudinal and
lateral deviations are:
• Absence of required acceleration
• Absence of required deceleration
• Absence of required course angle changes
• Improper acceleration
• Improper deceleration
• Improper course angle changes
The potential deviating vehicle behaviors create poten-
tially hazardous scenarios in the context of the operational
scenarios. Subsequently, the potentially hazardous scenarios
are checked in an expert-based evaluation. In order to form
hazardous scenarios, the presence of all three components
of a hazard has to be verified: source, target, and initiating
mechanism [27]. The analyzed set of hazardous scenarios
is free of redundant hazards, as the scenarios are based on
different externally observable behaviors of the ego-vehicle.
Based on the scenarios, we identify and describe hazards
for subsequent risk assessment. During hazard identification,
several consequences of each potentially hazardous scenario
can be analyzed and documented, creating one or many
hazardous scenarios and hazards (e.g., a hazard of a col-
lision with infrastructure and a hazard of a collision with a
pedestrian).
IV. CASE STUDY: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION IN
UNICARAGIL
The presented hazard identification strategy is developed
as part of the safety concept generation for the automated
driving function in the research project UNICARagil. In
UNICARagil, funded by the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research (BMBF), a project consortium of
institutes from eight German universities is aiming to show-
case four driverless cars for inner city traffic by 2022.
Six industrial partners support the development. The four
UNICARagil vehicles are based on a common modular
platform, but are designed for diverse use cases (cf. [28]
for a detailed concept and use case description).
A common driving function is developed and used for
the UNICARagil vehicles, as they share the technological
platform and design domain. Therefore, the developed safety
concept for the driving function applies to all of the four
realized vehicle types. In an early design stage, we mainly
aim to analyze the abstract behavioral safety aspects and not
specific functional safety concerns of individual components.
In this regard, Klamann et al. [29] detail the different levels
of abstraction for microscopic safety requirements employed
within UNICARagil.
On the top level, we express a desired externally observ-
able vehicle behavior in abstract safety goals that form the
foundation of the safety concept. So far, we have system-
atically identified hazards in representative traffic scenarios
and subsequently performed risk assessments in order to
define a first set of necessary safety goals. In this section
we describe one of the scenarios used in the concept phase
of development in UNICARagil and show the results of an
application of our proposed hazard identification strategy.
A. Scenario Description
The analyzed scenario “Occluded Pedestrian” is depicted
in Fig. 2: the ego-vehicle travels with the speed vEgo,0 in
the center of its own lane on a two-lane inner city road.
A pedestrian P enters the neighbor lane from an occlusion
and moves towards the center lane marking with vPed,0. To
account for the uncertainty in the predicted movement and
intentions of other traffic participants, the automated ego-
vehicle reduces its speed (cf. [6] for a deeper discussion of
risk-aware selection of an adequate travel speed).
At a later time step, the pedestrian halts at the center
lane marking for the ego-vehicle to pass. To account for the
uncertainties in the relative position and future movement of
the pedestrian, the ego-vehicle maximizes the lateral offset
within its own lane and passes at the low speed vEgo,pass.
The desired externally observable behavior of the ego-
vehicle in the presented operational scenario corresponds
with several of the defined competencies that are required
from automated vehicles: using the list of behavioral com-
petencies of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal
Automated Vehicles Policy [30], “Provide Safe Distance
From Vehicles, Pedestrians, Bicyclists on Side of the Road”
is one of the competencies the automated vehicle demon-
strates in our scenario. The scenario moreover corresponds
Ego
vEgo,0
vEgo,pass
vP,0
P
Fig. 2. Illustration of an operational reference scenario in UNICARagil. Pedestrian P enters the road from an occlusion and halts for the automated
ego-vehicle to pass. The ego-vehicle passes the waiting pedestrian with adjusted speed and lateral position.
to “Detect and Respond to Pedestrians in Road (Not Walking
Through Intersection or Crosswalk),” which is one of the
additional behavioral competencies listed in the Waymo
Safety Report [8].
B. Deviating Vehicle Behaviors
The subsequent step of our proposed hazard identification
strategy is the introduction of deviating vehicle behaviors in
the analyzed scenario. Here, the special dynamic characteris-
tics of the UNICARagil vehicles had to be considered: wheel
individual all-wheel steering with wheel angles up to 90 de-
grees allows sudden alterations of the course angle without
significant path curvature or yawing. To form potentially
hazardous scenarios, we used the generic list of deviations
from Section III to find applicable behavior deviations of the
ego-vehicle in the scenario “Occluded Pedestrian”:
• Absence of required speed adjustment
• Absence of required lateral position adjustment
• Improper acceleration at any moment
• Improper (rapid) deceleration
• Improper course angle changes
C. Hazards
To finally specify all involved hazards, the deviating
behaviors in the context of the described scenario (i.e. poten-
tially hazardous scenarios) have to be evaluated by experts.
In UNICARagil the potentially hazardous scenarios were
analyzed for actual hazards to health and life of vehicle
passengers and other traffic participants. In other scenarios,
clear violations of traffic law were also included in the list
of identified hazards (e.g., ignoring stop signs is considered
general hazardous behavior).
Hazards to health and life of the pedestrian were found in
the following hazardous scenarios:
• The vehicle does not adjust its speed when approaching
the pedestrian. The combination of inadequate traveling
speed and present uncertainties leads to a collision
between vehicle and pedestrian.
• The vehicle accelerates when approaching the pedes-
trian. The combination of high traveling speed and
present uncertainties leads to a collision between vehicle
and pedestrian.
• The vehicle changes its course angle towards the pedes-
trian, leading to a collision between vehicle and pedes-
trian.
Hazards to health and life of vehicle passengers were
found in the following hazardous scenarios:
• The vehicle decelerates rapidly during lane following.
• The vehicle changes its course angle towards the road-
side, leading to a collision between vehicle and station-
ary infrastructure.
V. COMPARISON OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
STRATEGIES
In order to compare the proposed strategy with other
published approaches, Fig. 3 depicts the individual stages
of three different strategies for hazard identification. As we
are acutely aware of the course of the research project of an
unmanned protective vehicle for hard shoulder roadworks
and can profoundly highlight differences to our ongoing
research, we again use publications about this project as
a reference for other approaches. Many of the publications
mentioned in Section II-B, however, also represent one of the
two generic strategies illustrated in Fig. 3a (i.e. [14], [19],
[22], [23]) and Fig. 3b (i.e. [15], [16], [24]).
The different processes share the input of information
regarding the functional range of the system under devel-
opment from an item definition. Also, all three approaches
eventually yield a set of identified hazards for subsequent risk
assessment. In the following paragraphs, the process flows
of the individual strategies are discussed in detail.
A. Combination of Malfunctions and Operational Scenes
The general process flow of the hazard identification
approach presented by Bagschik et al. [3] is depicted in
Fig. 3a. Following the development process of ISO 26262,
the item definition initially describes functions and oper-
ational scenarios to be analyzed for hazard identification.
As a next process step, they infer potential malfunctions
for each functionality of the item. Known malfunctions or
failure modes of a system under development can already be
described in the item definition and support this task.
In addition, Bagschik et al. [3] define operational scenes by
splitting potential operational scenarios into multiple distinct
scenes. Subsequently, possible malfunctions are put in the
Item definition
Operational
scenarios
Operational
scenes
Functions
Malfunctions
Systematic generation of
potentially hazardous scenarios
Expert-based evaluation
of hazardous scenarios
Identified hazards
Risk assessment
(a) Systematic hazard identification approach ap-
plied by Bagschik et al. [3]
Item definition
Operational
design
domain
Functions
Malfunctions
Expert-based identification
and evaluation of
hazardous scenarios
Identified hazards
Risk assessment
(b) Expert-based hazard identification performed
in [1]
Item definition
Operational scenarios
with desired vehicle behavior
Deviating vehicle behaviors
Systematic generation of
potentially hazardous scenarios
Expert-based evaluation
of hazardous scenarios
Identified hazards
Risk assessment
(c) Proposed hazard identification approach
Fig. 3. Stages of the discussed strategies for hazard identification. White boxes indicate the actual process steps for hazard identification, those with bold
outlines mark the source of hazardous scenarios.
context of the individual scenes to create potentially haz-
ardous scenarios. The set of scenarios is analyzed manually
for sources of potential harm in order to identify hazardous
scenarios. An expert-based evaluation of the hazardous sce-
narios detects and documents potential hazards for further
examination in the context of a risk assessment.
Bagschik et al. [3] apply their strategy to identify hazards
for the operation of an unmanned protective vehicle for
hard shoulder roadworks. The limited functional range of
the automated driving function of their use case still results
in 37 identified potential malfunctions, 108 relevant scenes,
and more than 21,000 potentially hazardous scenarios. After
automatic filtering the dataset contains 750 scenarios that
need to be manually assessed to evaluate and describe the
included hazards.
B. Expert-based Hazard Identification
The process flow of an expert-based hazard identification
based on Stolte et al. [1] is depicted in Fig. 3b. Again,
potential system malfunctioning behaviors are derived from
planned functions, which are described in the item definition.
In contrast to other strategies, Stolte et al. do not explicitly
define operational scenarios before performing the hazard
identification. The expert-identification of hazardous scenar-
ios is based on the operational design domain described in
the item definition. Following SAE J3016 [4], the operational
design domain defines the operating conditions under which
an automated vehicle is designed to function, including
environmental and geographical restrictions, as well as traffic
and roadway characteristics.
Based on the operational design domain and the potential
malfunctioning behaviors, experts identify hazardous sce-
narios and evaluate potential consequences in one process
step of the hazard analysis and risk assessment process
presented by Stolte et al. Analyzing the results of this
task, 14 distinct operational scenarios can be identified that
were starting points of different hazardous scenarios. The
considered operational scenarios differ in parameters such
as system status, ego-vehicle position and velocity, hard
shoulder setup, traffic situation, etc.
C. Proposed Hazard Identification Approach
The process flow of our proposed strategy described in
Section III is displayed in Fig. 3c. In contrast to the other
strategies, system malfunctions are not explicitly described
or used for hazard identification. Essentially, we introduce
generic longitudinal and lateral deviations in operational
scenarios and evaluate their consequences.
The use of deviations from a demanded safe behavior for
hazard identification has also been described by Bagschik
et al. [6]. They analyze the externally observable lateral
and longitudinal behavior of an automated vehicle when
approaching a pedestrian crossing. In contrast to the process
depicted in Fig. 3c, Bagschik et al. [6] first specify an
accident within the operational scenario of striking and
fatally injuring a crossing pedestrian. Subsequently, they
derive hazards directly from potential deviations of vehicle
behavior that can cause the specified accident. On the one
hand, their strategy saves the effort of evaluating system-
atically generated potentially hazardous scenarios. On the
other hand, potential accidents have to be identified and
selected for further analysis before potential deviating vehicle
behavior as initiating mechanisms of individual hazards
are examined. Ultimately, the systematic identification of
potential accidents within our proposed approach (cf. Fig. 3c)
supports the traceability of developed safety requirements,
especially when considering different scenarios with several
traffic participants.
D. Discussion
The expert-based hazard identification presented by Stolte
et al. [1] was successfully applied in the context of a very
limited operational design domain. Other vehicle automation
functionalities will offer fewer restrictions regarding the
functional range, which far increases the complexity of a
manual identification of potential hazardous scenarios. In
addition, the already high number of potential malfunctions
of an automated vehicle presumably increases with its func-
tional range. Thus, we argue that the development of a sound
set of safety goals for complex automated driving systems
ultimately requires a systematic combination of operational
scenarios with potential malfunctioning behaviors.
All of the 37 malfunctioning behaviors identified by
Bagschik et al. [3] can be described by one of the deviations
from the desired behavior used in the proposed approach
(cf. Section III). This reduces the amount of malfunctioning
behaviors to be individually combined with operational sce-
narios to six. Furthermore, filtering can be performed before
manually examining the relevant scenarios in an expert-based
evaluation of hazardous scenarios. For example, absence of
required acceleration, deceleration, and course angle changes
is only applicable in specific segments of a scenario.
Altogether, the proposed approach for hazard identification
avoids the inefficiency of evaluating identical hazardous
scenarios multiple times in an expert-based hazard analysis
process. However, the large amount of potentially hazardous
scenarios when applying systematic strategies is a product of
both, the quantity of operational scenarios and the quantity
of potential malfunctions. The number of distinct operational
scenarios to consider results from the definition of the
operational design domain of the system under development.
Current research shows that, even when limiting the op-
erational design domain to one specific road type, the set
of operational scenarios created by a systematic generation
process is too large to be manually analyzed [31].
In an early design phase, corresponding with best practice,
a reduced set of operational scenarios is analyzed within
the hazard analysis and risk assessment task. For this, a
systematic generation of reference scenarios for requirement
analysis and safety assessment as described by Ebner [32]
can be integrated. The analysis of a few important scenarios
makes it possible to create an initial set of safety goals and
to start developing mitigation strategies for the identified
hazards. Early first iterations of the concept phase tasks of
safety conceptualization are a prerequisite for aligning the
functional range described in the item definition with feasible
safety requirements [33].
Within the phase of preliminary design, the proposed
approach far improves the efficiency of the expert-based
hazard evaluation and risk assessment. Still, the manual
examination of potentially hazardous scenarios entails the
disadvantage that relevant hazards could be misjudged or
omitted. Within later stages of development, an exhaustive
set of scenarios has to be analyzed. Corner cases have to be
identified, in which hazardous consequences of malfunctions
occur that have not been addressed in the preliminary safety
concept.
E. Subsequent Process Steps
Concluding the hazard analysis and risk assessment task,
the identified hazards are classified and safety goals are
defined to address the hazards. The next work product of
the safety life cycle of ISO 26262 is the generation of a
functional safety concept. A distinct feature of functional
safety concepts is the consideration of specific functional
components when developing mitigation strategies and defin-
ing safety requirements on the basis of safety goals.
The hazard identification strategy outlined in ISO 26262
and performed in related work (cf. Section II) simultaneously
generates traceable links between hazards and functions:
hazardous scenarios are derived from malfunctions, which
are associated with specific functionalities. With regard to the
results of our proposed hazard identification approach, these
links are missing and have to be created a posteriori. There-
fore, the deviations of relevant functions (i.e. malfunctions)
that lead to the undesired externally observable behavior in
operational scenarios have to be identified.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this contribution, we discussed an adaptation of the
strategy for hazard identification for driverless vehicle de-
velopment. Our main goal was to reduce the amount of
potentially hazardous scenarios to be analyzed in an early
design phase. Instead of focusing on malfunctions, we based
our approach on a combination of operational scenarios with
potential deviations from the desired vehicle behavior. To
indicate the achieved efficiency, we presented the process
and results of an application of our identification approach
in the ongoing research project UNICARagil as a case study.
In the future, we plan to associate the discussion of
a systematic specification of operational scenarios which
are of value for early hazard analyses with our presented
hazard identification strategy. The use of a structured process
for finding and analyzing the right scenarios will improve
the description of a systematic preliminary development of
automated vehicles. Additionally, the presented approach
will be further evaluated in the context of the development
of specific safety requirements for the UNICARagil vehi-
cles. One crucial subsequent process step is the systematic
derivation of component-related safety requirements and test
cases from vehicle level safety goals (cf. [29]).
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